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Abstract
We assess the effects of reforms in product and labor markets in a model economy featuring 
credit restrictions and pre-existing long-term debt. Both elements, which are core features 
of the current scenario faced by some euro area countries, combine to produce a slow and 
protracted deleveraging of the private sector and a persistent recession following a negative 
financial shock. In this environment, we show that product and labor market reforms may 
stimulate output and employment even in the short run, despite their defl ationary effects. 
Furthermore, by favoring a faster recovery of investment and collateral values, product 
market reforms bring forward the end of deleveraging and the exit from recession. 
Keywords: deleveraging, collateral constraints, long-run debt, structural reforms.
JEL classifi cation: E43, E44, E65, G21.
Resumen
Evaluamos los efectos de las reformas en los mercados de productos y de trabajo en 
un modelo con restricciones de crédito y deuda a largo plazo. Ambos elementos, que 
caracterizan en gran medida la situación actual de algunas economías en la zona del euro, 
producen un escenario de desapalancamiento lento del sector privado y de recesión duradera 
en respuesta a una perturbación fi nanciera negativa. En este marco, encontramos que las 
reformas en los mercados de productos y de trabajo pueden estimular la producción y el 
empleo, incluso a corto plazo, a pesar de sus efectos defl acionarios. Además, al favorecer 
una recuperación más rápida de la inversión y del valor de los colaterales, la reforma en los 
mercados de productos adelanta el fi nal del desapalancamiento y la salida de la recesión.
Palabras clave: desapalancamiento, restricciones de colateral, deuda a largo plazo, 
reformas estructurales.
Códigos JEL: E43, E44, E65, G21.
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1 Introduction
More than six years after the beginning of the crisis, economic growth in the periphery
of the Euro area remains weighed down by weak domestic demand, in a context
of high levels of private debt. Therein, the lack of room for maneuver to apply
expansionary fiscal and (conventional) monetary policies is drawing a scenario of
protracted private sector deleveraging amid low growth, with few policy options to
bring some relief. Among the available options, structural reforms in product and
labor markets have attracted much attention by governments, multilateral bodies
and commentators. In official circles, a consensus has arisen on the desirability of
making markets more efficient in order to increase the overall competitiveness of the
weakest European economies and improve their future growth prospects.1
Common wisdom suggests that internal devaluation processes, fostered by reforms
leading to lower and/or more flexible prices and wages, should help the external
sector lead the recovery in the short term. Likewise, growth potential should benefit
from more competitive markets, with the resulting permanent income effects having
a positive impact on current expenditure of forward-looking households and firms
(expectations channel). However, absent the margin for expansionary monetary and
fiscal policies, more competitive markets are likely to unchain contractionary forces
in the short term arising from higher real interest rates and debt-deflation effects due
to lower prices and/or wages (deflationary channel).
Which of the two previous forces -international competitiveness and expectations
versus deflationary channels- dominates remains an open question and, in princi-
ple, well-intended reforms could end-up worsening the recession and postponing the
recovery. This paper tries to shed light on this issue. To this aim, we construct
a macroeconomic model upon two core elements that are suggested by the recent
experience of the European periphery countries: (i) a widespread tightening of the
financing conditions faced by households and firms, and (ii) a slow and protracted
process of deleveraging.
In particular, we build a general equilibrium model of a small open economy
inside a monetary union. Households and entrepreneurs obtain new credit subject
to collateral constraints, such that their outstanding debt cannot exceed a fraction
(’loan-to-value’) of the value of collateralizable assets. As in Iacoviello (2005), real
estate is the only pledgeable asset. A key point of departure from most recent papers
in the macrofinance area, aimed at producing an empirically plausible slow delever-
aging path, is that we consider long term debt contracts. As in Woodford (2001),
we assume that nominal debt outstanding is amortized at a constant contractual
1See e.g. OECD (2012), European Commission (2013) and International Monetary Fund (2013).
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rate. This creates an asymmetry in the dynamics of the debt stock. In ’normal
times’, when collateral values are high enough so as to allow for new credit flows,
the value of available collateral restricts the size of the debt stock. By contrast,
following an adverse shock that reduces debtors’ collateral values sufficiently, new
credit is frozen and outstanding loans are amortized mechanically at the contractual
rate. Therefore, the model features two debt regimes with asymmetric speeds of debt
accumulation and deleveraging, among which the economy switches endogenously as
collateral values fall below or rise above some critical thresholds.
In order to construct a baseline deleveraging scenario motivated by the financial
origin of the recent crisis, we introduce a ’credit crunch’ shock that takes the form
of an unexpected and permanent fall in the loan-to-value ratios of both households
and entrepreneurs. The shock produces a sharp fall in real estate prices. As a result,
collateral values fall sufficiently so as to move the economy into the debt regime in
which gross new credit suddenly stops and the stock of debt starts decaying at the
contractual amortization rate. The credit freeze depresses domestic demand. The
ensuing fall in production prices and improvement in international competitiveness
lead to an increase in net exports, which is not sufficient however to avoid a prolonged
recession. At some point, the value of collateral relative to debt recovers sufficiently to
justify new credit flows. This gives rise to an expansionary phase, characterized by a
virtuous circle of higher borrowers’ net worth, increasing asset prices and new lending,
that ultimately lead to positive growth and higher employment. Importantly, the
time at which the economy switches from the deleveraging phase to the recovery one
is endogenous.
We simulate the effects of structural reforms against the backdrop of the baseline
deleveraging scenario just discussed. In particular, we consider unexpected, per-
manent reductions in desired price and wage markups. As expected, reforms that
enhance competition in product and labor markets produce long run gains in GDP.
More interestingly, we also find that this set of reforms can mitigate the short-run
output and employment losses caused by the deleveraging shock, although the effec-
tiveness of the reform in this respect varies depending on the market at hand.
In the case of the product market reform, stronger competition and the ensuing
long-run gains in consumption and output lead (forward-looking) households and
firms to increase their investment in the short run, vis-à-vis the baseline (no-reform)
scenario. Stronger investment demand in turn alleviates the fall in real estate prices
produced by the deleveraging shock. This reinforces the short-run gains in investment
in two related ways. First, borrowers anticipate higher collateral values from the
period in which they regain access to credit onwards. Second, a faster recovery in
collateral values allows borrowers to receive new credit at an earlier date. That is, the
reform brings forward the end of the deleveraging process and hence of the recession.
These effects (more collateralized credit at an earlier date, and an earlier exit from
recession) leads borrowers to further increase their investment demand today, with
the resulting boost to asset prices, collateral values, and so on.
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By contrast, the labor market reform, which yields long-run gains similar to
those from the product market reform, produces only modest improvements in GDP
in the short-run. Two factors explain this difference. First, this reform makes labor
cheaper relative to capital (equipment and commercial real estate), and hence does
not produce a significant rise in the demand for real estate or in its price. As a
consequence, neither collateral values, nor investment, nor the end of deleveraging
are much affected. Second, unlike a reduction in price markups, a reduction in wage
markups needs to overcome a double layer of nominal rigidities (wages and prices)
before affecting actual production prices. Motivated by this observation, we also
consider a broader labor market reform that includes an increase in nominal wage
flexibility. We find that the latter reform does generate sizable short-run gains in
economic activity.
The presence of collateral constraints and long-term debt in our model play an im-
portant role, essentially by buffering the short term impact of reform-driven changes
in various prices, such as consumption and real estate prices, and the real interest
rate. On the one hand, credit restrictions and long term debt mitigate the (nega-
tive) deflationary effects induced by the reforms. First, the fact that borrowers do
not obtain new credit and simply amortize their debts during the deleveraging phase
implies that the increase in real interest rates brought by the reforms has little effect
on domestic demand. Second, since under long-term contracts debtors pay back only
a small fraction of their outstanding debt each period, the deflation produced by the
reform has only a second order effect on borrowers’ net debt flows and hence on their
spending capacity.
On the other hand, long-run debt also attenuates the impact of real estate prices
on economic activity, by decoupling debt capacity from collateral values during the
deleveraging phase. In the case of the product market reform, the positive effect
of higher real estate prices (relative to the no-reform scenario) on expenditure is
watered down by the fact that borrowers cannot pledge the higher collateral to
obtain new loans while deleveraging. In fact, we show that the short-run gains from
the reform are lower than they would be in a setup with short-term (one-period)
debt. On the contrary, in the case of labor market reforms, since asset prices are
barely affected, long-term debt improves the short-run response of GDP by eroding
the aforementioned debt-deflation and real interest rate channels.
Finally, the foreign sector plays an important role in shaping the short-run effects
of reforms. In this regard, we show that higher elasticities of exports and imports
with respect to the terms of trade lead to larger short-run gains from reforms. In par-
ticular, a labor market reform based only on lower wage markups may lead to small
negative short-run effects on GDP and employment if price elasticities are sufficiently
low. Thus, the short-run effects of structural reforms depend to an important extent
on the intensity with which the resulting gains in international competitiveness carry
over to actual trade flows.
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The paper is organized as follows. We briefly describe the related literature in
Section 2. The model and the calibration are presented in Section 3. The baseline
deleveraging scenario is analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 is devoted to analyzing the
impact of several reforms in product and labor markets, with further inspection of
the relevant channels in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. First, a number of recent contri-
butions analyze the macroeconomic impact of structural reforms, with special atten-
tion to the short-run, when monetary policy cannot accommodate the deflationary
effects of such reforms. In the context of a standard New Keynesian (NK) frame-
work that abstracts from financial frictions, Eggertsson, Ferrero and Raffo (2014)
show that permanent reductions in product and labor market markups may be con-
tractionary if monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB), due
to the deflationary impact of the reforms and the resulting increase in real inter-
est rates. Our model adds a relatively rich financial apparatus to the standard NK
framework, with the aim of studying the role of reforms in a scenario of widespread
tightening of financing constraints and slow deleveraging, which we consider as core
elements of the current situation in the Euro Area periphery. In our set-up, reforms
are deflationary as well, but the resulting negative short-run effects (which in our
framework include the Fisherian debt-deflation channel) are generally dominated by
the positive effects of reforms.
Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana and Rubio-Ramírez (2012) also study
the effects of supply-side reforms when monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB,
in the framework of a stylized two-period NK model. They offer some quantita-
tive examples showing that credible announcements of future increases in product
market competition unchain positive wealth effects that may raise consumption and
output today. In the context of a fully dynamic open-economy model with financing
constraints and long-run debt, we show that increases in product and labor market
competition may deliver short-run gains in output even if implemented unexpectedly.
Galí and Monacelli (2014) analyze the employment effects of a temporary reduc-
tion in payroll taxes (which has similar effects to those of a temporary contraction in
desired wage markups) in the context of a standard NK small open economy model.
In their framework, the monetary authority is constrained not by the ZLB but by its
concern for nominal exchange rate stabilization. They find that the impact of wage
adjustments on employment is smaller the more the central bank seeks to stabilize
the exchange rate. Here we consider a small open economy inside a monetary union,
and thus we do not study the interaction between supply-side policy measures and
the degree of monetary policy accommodation. Instead, we focus on the effects of
structural reforms (implemented on a permanent basis) in a context of slow and
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protracted deleveraging of the private sector, showing that such reforms may yield
sizeable short-run gains in economic activity and employment.2
More generally, our paper also contributes to the growing literature on the macro-
economic effects of deleveraging processes. Fornaro (2012) and Benigno and Romei
(2012) report a sharp, though short-lived, drop in output and employment after a
negative financial shock in an economy with nominal inertia, fixed exchange rates
and a constant nominal interest rate. Guerreri and Iacoviello (2014) find that reces-
sions driven by asset price deflations have a significant negative impact on spending
and output. Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), and Calvo, Coricelli, and Ottonello
(2012) find similar effects of deleveraging on output and employment. Our paper
also sheds light on some of these issues although it differs with respect both to its
motivation, which here is on the impact of structural reforms, and to some modeling
assumptions, especially the one concerning long-term debt, which is a centerpiece in
our analysis. Regarding this last issue, Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2013)
also consider the existence of long-term debt in a setup in which a deleveraging shock
has a relatively minor effect on economic activity, as it gives rise to a wealth redistri-
bution effect from debtors to creditors that essentially washes out at the aggregate
level. Besides targeting a different motivating question, our model gives rise to a
deleveraging scenario that entails a protracted and costly recession, in line with the
evidence summarized by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
2More loosely related to our paper and the above contributions is the work of Cacciatore and
Fiori (2013). In a model featuring endogenous product creation and labor market frictions, they
discuss the effects of deregulation in the form of permanent reductions in producer entry costs, firing
restrictions and unemployment benefits. In a related environment, Cacciatore, Fiori and Ghironi
(2013) analyze the design of optimal monetary policy.
3 Model
We now present a general equilibrium model of a small open economy that belongs
to a monetary union. The real side of the economy is fairly standard. Households
obtain utility from consumption goods and from housing units. Consumption goods
are produced using a combination of household labor, commercial real estate and
equipment capital goods. Construction firms build real estate (both for residential
and commercial purposes) using labor and consumption goods; the latter are also
used as inputs by equipment capital goods producers. Final goods and labor markets
are both characterized by monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities.
On the financial side, the structure is as follows. There are three types of con-
sumers: patient households, impatient households, and (impatient) entrepreneurs.
In equilibrium, the latter two borrow from the former and from the rest of the world.
Debt contracts are long-term. In periods in which borrowers are able to receive new
credit flows, they do so subject to collateral constraints. Real estate is the only
collateralizable asset. We will henceforth refer to impatient and patient households
as ’constrained’ and ’unconstrained’ households, respectively.
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All variables are in real terms unless otherwise specified, with the consumption
goods basket acting as the numeraire.
3.1 Households
There is a representative constrained household and a representative unconstrained
household, denoted respectively by superscripts c and u.
3.1.1 Cost minimization
Before analyzing dynamic household optimization, we first derive the static cost min-
imization problem, which is common to both households types. Households consume
a basket of home and foreign goods, denoted respectively by subscripts H and F ,
cxt =

ω1/εHH

cxH,t
(εH−1)/εH + (1− ωH)1/εH

cxF,t
(εH−1)/εHεH/(εH−1) , (1)
for x = c, u, where cxH,t is a basket of domestic good varieties,
cxH,t =
$ 1
0
cxH,t (z)
(εp−1)/εp dz
	εp/(εp−1)
, (2)
where εp > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across consumption varieties z ∈ [0, 1].
Let PH,t (z) denote the price of home good variety z, and PF,t the price of the foreign
goods basket. Household x = c, u minimizes nominal consumption expenditure," 1
0
PH,t (z) c
x
H,t (z) dz+PF,tc
x
F,t, subject to (1) and (2). The first order conditions can
be expressed as
cxH,t = ωH

PH,t
Pt
	−εH
cxt , c
x
F,t = (1− ωH)

PF,t
Pt
	−εH
cxt , c
x
H,t (z) =

PH,t (z)
PH,t
	−εp
cxH,t,
(3)
where
Pt =

ωHP
1−εH
H,t + (1− ωH)P
1−εH
F,t
1/(1−εH)
, PH,t =
$ 1
0
PH,t (z)
1−εp dz
	1/(1−εp)
are the consumer price index (CPI) and the producer price index (PPI), respectively.
Nominal spending in domestic goods equals
" 1
0
PH,t (z) c
x
H,t (z) dz = PH,tc
x
H,t, whereas
total nominal consumption spending equals PH,tcxH,t + PF,tc
x
F,t = Ptc
x
t .
As noted before, consumption goods are also used as inputs by construction firms
and equipment capital producers. The latter are assumed to combine home and
foreign goods analogously to households, and similarly for domestic good varieties.
This gives rise to investment demand functions analogous to (3).
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3.1.2 Unconstrained households
The unconstrained household maximizes
E0
∞#
t=0
(βu)t

log (cut ) + ϑ log (h
u
t )− χ
$ 1
0
nut (i)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
di

,
where nut (i) are labor services of type i ∈ [0, 1] and hut are housing units, subject to
the following budget constraint (expressed in units of the consumption goods basket),
cut + dt + p
h
t

hut − (1− δh)hut−1

=
Rt−1
πt
dt−1 +
$ 1
0
Wt (i)
Pt
nut (i) di,
where dt is the real value of net holdings of riskless nominal debt, Rt is the gross
nominal interest rate,3 δh is the depreciation rate of real estate, pht is the real price
of real estate, πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 is gross CPI inflation, and Wt (i) is the nominal wage for
labor services of type i. The first order conditions are standard; they are listed in
Appendix A, together with all other equilibrium conditions.
3In order to guarantee stationarity in the net foreign asset position, we assume Rt =
R∗ exp(−ψnfayt ), where R∗ is the world gross nominal interest rate and nfa
y
t is the net foreign
asset position as a fraction of GDP (to be derived below).
3.1.3 Constrained households
The constrained household’s preferences are given by
E0
∞#
t=0
βt

log (cct) + ϑ log (ht)− χ
$ 1
0
nct (i)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
di

,
where β < βu, i.e. the constrained household is relatively impatient. The household
faces the following budget constraint,
cct + p
h
t [ht − (1− δh)ht−1] = bt −
Rt−1
πt
bt−1 +
$ 1
0
Wt (i)
Pt
nct (i) di,
where bt is the real value of household debt outstanding at the end of period t.
Unlike in most of the literature, which typically assumes short-term (one-period)
debt, we assume that debt contracts are long-term. In the interest of tractability, we
assume that at the beginning of time t the household repays a fraction 1 − γ of all
nominal debt outstanding at the end of period t − 1, regardless of when that debt
was issued. This type of perpetual debt is similar to the one proposed by Woodford
(2001) as a tractable way of modelling long-term debt. In real terms, the outstanding
principal of household debt then evolves as follows,
bt =
bt−1
πt
+ bnewt − (1− γ)
bt−1
πt
= bnewt + γ
bt−1
πt
, (4)
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where bnewt denotes new debt issuance net of voluntary amortizations, i.e. amortiza-
tions beyond the contractual debt repayment (1− γ) bt−1/πt.
We assume that, in ’normal times’ (in a sense to be specified below), household
borrowing is subject to collateral constraints, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Fol-
lowing Iacoviello (2005), outstanding debt bt cannot exceed a fraction mt (the ’loan-
to-value ratio’, which we assume to be exogenously time-varying) of the expected
discounted value of the household’s residential stock: bt ≤ mtR−1t Etπt+1pht+1ht. For
brevity, we will refer to such pledgeable value of collateral as collateral value. This
debt limit, however, is only effective as long as it exceeds γbt−1/πt, which we will
henceforth refer to as the contractual amortization path. Indeed, if the collateral value
falls below such path, lowering bt to the value of collateral would require lenders not
only to reduce gross new credit to zero (its lower bound), but also to impose ad-
ditional amortizations beyond those agreed in the contract (i.e. bnewt < 0). Since
lenders cannot force borrowers to pay back faster than the contractual amortization
rate, the contractual amortization path becomes the effective debt limit. Therefore,
long run debt implies the following asymmetric borrowing constraint,
bt ≤ R−1t mtEtπt+1pht+1ht, if
mt
Rt
Etπt+1p
h
t+1ht ≥ γ
bt−1
πt
, (5)
bt ≤ γ
bt−1
πt
, if
mt
Rt
Etπt+1p
h
t+1ht < γ
bt−1
πt
. (6)
This asymmetry gives rise to a double debt regime. In ’normal times’ in which collat-
eral values exceed the contractual amortization path, debt is restricted by the former.
In this baseline regime, households can receive new credit against their housing col-
lateral, with the constraint that such new credit does not exceed the gap between
collateral values and the amortization path.4 However, in the face of shocks that
reduce collateral values sufficiently, the economy switches to an alternative regime,
in which new credit disappears and debt is restricted instead by the contractual
amortization path. Notice that changes from one regime to the other take place
endogenously. This is an important element of our framework, as will become clear
when we analyze the effects of structural reforms.
The Appendix contains the first order conditions of the constrained household’s
optimization problem. For future reference, we show here the optimal choice of
housing,
pht
cct
=
ϑ
ht
+ βEt
(1− δh) pht+1
cct+1
+ ξt
mt
Rt
Etπt+1p
h
t+1, (7)
where ξt is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the collateral constraint (eq. 5).
Equation (7) illustrates that, when the collateral constraint is binding (ξt > 0), the
marginal value of housing is higher due to the possibility of borrowing against it.
This possibility disappears once the economy enters into the alternative debt regime,
in which the collateral constraint ceases to be effective (ξt = 0).
4Indeed, from (4) and (5) we obtain bnewt ≤ mtR−1t Etπt+1pht+1ht − γbt−1/πt.
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3.2 Production
Entrepreneurs produce an intermediate good and sell it to retailers, who transform
it into consumption good varieties. Entrepreneurs and retailers conform the con-
sumption goods sector. In addition, construction firms produce real estate, both for
residential and commercial use, whereas equipment capital is produced by capital
goods producers. All sectors operate under perfect competition, except retailers who
enjoy monopolistic power.
3.2.1 Entrepreneurs
A representative entrepreneur produces an intermediate product and sells it to re-
tailers at a perfectly competitive real (CPI-deflated) price mct. The entrepreneur
maximizes
E0
∞#
t=0
βt log cet ,
subject to
cet+p
h
t

het − (1− δh)het−1

+qt [kt − (1− δk) kt−1] = mctyet−
Wt
Pt
net+b
e
t−
Rt−1
πt
bet−1+
#
s=r,h,k
Πst ,
yet = k
αk
t−1

het−1
αh (net )1−αk−αh ,
where yet is output of the intermediate good, kt−1 is equipment capital, δk is the
depreciation rate of equipment capital, het−1 is commercial real estate, n
e
t is a basket
of labor services, Wt is a nominal wage index, bet is the real value of entrepreneurial
debt outstanding at the end of period t, and {Πst}s=r,h,k are real profits from the
retail, construction and equipment goods-producing sectors.5
Entrepreneurs’ maximization is also subject to an asymmetric borrowing con-
straint analogous to the one on constrained households,
bet ≤ R−1t metEtπt+1pht+1het , if
met
Rt
Etπt+1p
h
t+1h
e
t ≥ γe
bet−1
πt
, (8)
bet ≤ γe
bet−1
πt
, if
met
Rt
Etπt+1p
h
t+1h
e
t < γ
e b
e
t−1
πt
, (9)
where we allow for a different loan-to-value ratio (met) and contractual amortization
rate (1 − γe) for entrepreneurs. Again, it is instructive to analyze here the optimal
demand for commercial real estate,
pht
cet
= βEt

mct+1αhyet+1/h
e
t + (1− δh) pht+1
cet+1

+ ξet
met
Rt
Etπt+1p
h
t+1, (10)
5Notice that entrepreneurs are assumed to own the firms in the latter sectors. We adopt this
specification because we are interested in analyzing how profit accumulation affects productive
investment decisions, which in our model are made by the entrepreneurs.
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where ξet is the Lagrange multipliers associated to constraint (8). Analogously to
the case of constrained households, in periods in which the collateral constraint
binds (ξet > 0) the marginal value of commercial real estate is higher thanks to the
possibility of borrowing against it.
3.2.2 Retailers
A continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers indexed by z ∈ [0, 1] purchase
the intermediate input from entrepreneurs at the real price mct, and transform it
one for one into final good varieties. Retailers’ real marginal cost is thus mct. Each
retailer z faces a demand curve
yt (z) =

PH,t (z)
PH,t
	−εp
yt ≡ ydt (PH,t (z)) , (11)
where yt is aggregate demand of the consumption basket (to be defined below).
Assuming Calvo (1983) price-setting, a retailer that has the chance of setting its
nominal price at time t solves
max
PH,t(z)
Et
∞#
s=0
(βθp)
s c
e
t
cet+s


PH,t (z)
Pt+s
−mct+s

ydt+s (PH,t (z)) ,
where θp is the probability of not adjusting the price. The first-order condition is
standard (see Appendix), with all time-t price setters choosing a common optimal
price P˜H,t. In the case of flexible prices (θp = 0), retailers set P˜H,t = ε
p
εp−1Ptmct,
i.e. they charge a markup εp/ (εp − 1) over nominal marginal costs. Therefore, the
markup factor εp/ (εp − 1)measures the degree of monopolistic distortions in product
markets.
3.2.3 Construction firms
A representative construction firm maximizes its expected discounted stream of prof-
its, E0
 ∞
t=0 β
t ce0
cet
Πht , where Π
h
t = p
h
t I
h
t − WtPt n
h
t − iht , subject to the production tech-
nology
Iht =

nht
ω

iht

1− Φh
2

iht
iht−1
− 1
	21−ω
,
where nht are labor services, i
h
t are consumption goods, and I
h
t are new real estate
units.6
6We include labor services in the production function of construction firms so as to allow for
long-run changes in real estate prices. Without labor in construction (ω = 0), real estate prices are
always unity in the long run. More generally, it can be shown that pss = (wss)
ω ω−ω (1− ω)−(1−ω).
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3.2.4 Equipment capital producers
A representative equipment capital producer maximizes its expected discounted
stream of profits, E0
 ∞
t=0 β
t ce0
cet
Πkt , where Π
k
t = qtIt − it, subject to the technology
It = it

1− Φk
2

it
it−1
− 1
	2
,
where it are consumption goods, and It are new equipment capital goods.
3.3 Wage setting
Both entrepreneurs and construction firms use a basket of labor services by con-
strained and unconstrained households,
nst = (n
s,c
t )
μs (ns,ut )
1−μs ,
where ns,xt are labor services provided by type-x household, x = c, u, to each sector
s = e, h. We assume that both worker types (constrained and unconstrained) earn
the same wage. Cost minimization then implies (1− μs)n
s,c
t = μsn
s,u
t , for s = e, h.
From each household type, each sector demands in turn a basket of labor service
varieties,
ns,xt =
$ 1
0
ns,xt (i)
(εw−1)/εw di
	εw/(εw−1)
,
for x = c, u and s = e, h, where εw > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across labor
varieties i ∈ [0, 1]. Demand for each labor variety by each sector of production
is thus given by ns,xt (i) = (Wt (i) /Wt)
−εw ns,xt , for x = c, u and s = e, h, where
Wt ≡ (
" 1
0
Wt (i)
1−εw di)1/(1−ε
w) is the nominal wage index. Total demand for each
variety of labor services is thus
nxt (i) ≡ n
e,x
t (i) + n
h,x
t (i) =

Wt (i)
Wt
	−εw 
ne,xt + n
h,x
t

≡ nd,xt (Wt (i)) ,
for x = c, u. Total nominal wage income earned by each type-x household equals" 1
0
Wt (i)n
x
t (i) di = Wtn
x
t , where n
x
t ≡ n
e,x
t + n
h,x
t .
As in Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000; EHL), nominal wages are set à la Calvo
(1983). In particular, a union representing all type-i workers maximizes the utility
of the households to which such workers belong. Let λxt ≡ 1/cxt denote the marginal
utility of real income for each household type x = c, u. Then a union that has the
chance to reset the nominal wage at time t chooses Wt (i) to maximize
#
x=c,u
Et
∞#
s=0
(βxθw)
s
⎡
⎢⎣λxt+s
Wt (i)
Pt+s
nd,xt+s (Wt (i))− χ

nd,xt+s (Wt (i))
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
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where θw is the probability of not adjusting the wage and β
c = β. All time-t wage-
setters choose a common optimal wage W˜t; see the first-order condition in the Ap-
pendix. In the case of flexible wages (θw = 0), workers charge a markup εw/ (εw − 1)
over a weighted average of constrained and unconstrained households’ marginal
rates of substitution between consumption and labor. Therefore, the markup factor
εw/ (εw − 1) measures the degree of monopolistic distortions in the labor market.
3.4 Foreign sector
A representative exporter produces the following basket of domestic consumption
goods: xt = (
" 1
0
xt (z)
(εp−1)/εp dz)ε
p/(εp−1), where xt (z) is demand for each domestic
good variety. Cost minimization implies that the exporter’s demand for each variety
is xt (z) = (PH,t (z) /PH,t)
−εp xt, and total spending is
" 1
0
PH,t (z) xt (z) dz = PH,txt.
The exporter sells the basket xt in export markets under perfect competition. The
zero profit condition implies that the market price of the export basket is exactly PH,t.
Assuming that foreign consumers’ preferences are analogous to those of domestic
consumers, foreign demand for the basket of domestic goods is given by
xt = ζ

PH,t
PF,t
	−εF
yF,t,
where PF,t and yF,t are the foreign price level and aggregate demand (both exogenous)
and εF is the price elasticity of exports. Defining the terms of trade p∗t ≡ PH,t/PF,t,
the latter evolve according to p∗t = p
∗
t−1πH,t/πF,t,where πF,t ≡ PF,t/PF,t−1 is foreign
inflation.
3.5 Aggregation and market clearing
Each retailer z demands ydt (PH,t (z)) units of the intermediate input, as given by
(11). Total demand for the latter equals
" 1
0
ydt (PH,t (z)) dz = ytΔt, where Δt ≡" 1
0
(PH,t (z) /PH,t)
−εp dz denotes relative price dispersion. Market clearing in the
intermediate good market thus requires
kαkt−1

het−1
αh (net )1−αh−αk = ytΔt.
As noted before, investment-goods producers and exporters demand the same combi-
nation of domestic consumption goods as consumers. Therefore, aggregate demand
for the basket of domestic consumption goods is given by,
yt = c
c
H,t + c
u
H,t + c
e
H,t + iH,t + i
h
H,t + xt. (12)
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Total demand for real estate must equal total supply,
ht + h
u
t + h
e
t = I
h
t + (1− δh)

ht−1 + h
u
t−1 + h
e
t−1

.
Total demand for equipment capital must equal total supply: kt = It+(1− δk) kt−1.
Labor market clearing requires nct + n
u
t = n
e
t + n
h
t . This completes the model. We
may combine all market clearing conditions and budget constraints to obtain the
current account identity (which is redundant as a result of Walras’ Law),
nfat =
Rt−1
πt
nfat−1 +
PH,t
Pt
xt −
PF,t
Pt

ccF,t + c
u
F,t + c
e
F,t + iF,t + i
h
F,t

,
where nfat ≡ dt − bt − bet is the real (CPI-deflated) net foreign asset position. We
finally define real (PPI-deflated) GDP as
gdpt ≡ yt +
Pt
PH,t
(qtIt − it) +
Pt
PH,t

pht I
h
t − iht

=
Pt
PH,t
ctott +
Pt
PH,t

qtIt + p
h
t I
h
t

+


xt −
PF,t
PH,t

ctotF,t + iF,t + i
h
F,t

,
where in the second equality we have used (12) and zH,t = PtPH,t zt −
PF,t
PH,t
zF,t for
z = cc, cu, ce, i, ih, and where ctott ≡ cct+cut+cet is total consumption (total consumption
imports ctotF,t are defined analogously). The net foreign asset position as a fraction of
GDP is then simply nfayt ≡ Ptnfat/PH,tgdpt.
3.6 Calibration
We calibrate the model to the Spanish economy. As explained in the introduction,
we are motivated by the recent experience of the peripheral EMU economies, for
which structural reforms in product and labor markets have been advocated as a
means of fostering economic recovery. Spain’s labor market has traditionally been
considered as particularly inefficient within the EMU context, while some room for
improved competitiveness also exists in its product markets.7 This feature, together
with the on-going deleveraging process of Spanish households and firms, make Spain
an ideal case study for the purpose of our analysis.
The time period is a quarter. We match the model’s steady state to a number
of empirical targets in 2007, the year prior to the start of the financial crisis. We
do not claim, however, that the Spanish economy was in (or close to) a steady state
in 2007. Instead, our model’s steady state should be interpreted as the economy’s
initial condition for the purpose of our simulation exercises.
7See e.g. European Commission (2011) and International Monetary Fund (2011).
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p p
The discount factor of the impatient agents is set to β = 0.98, following Iacoviello
(2005). For patient households, we choose βu = 1.025−1/4, which is consistent with a
steady state nominal interest rate of Rss = 1.0251/4πss = R∗e−ψ(nfa
y
ss). We set world
inflation to πF,ss = 1, which implies πH,ss = πss = 1 in a stationary equilibrium.
Choosing R∗ = 1.021/4 for the world nominal interest rate, we then set ψ to replicate
net foreign assets over GDP in 2007, nfayss = −79.3%. The inverse labor supply
elasticity is set to ϕ = 4, consistently with a large body of micro evidence. The
weight parameter in the consumption basket, ωH , is set to match gross exports over
GDP in 2007 (26.9%). Based on evidence for Spain in García et al. (2009), the price
elasticity of exports and imports is set to εF = εH = 1. The scale parameter in
export demand, ζ, is chosen such that steady-state terms of trade p∗ss are normalized
to 1.
The elasticities of substitution across varieties of consumption goods and labor
services, εp and εw, control the degree of market power in product and labor markets,
respectively. We set εp = 7, implying an initial price markup of εp/(εp − 1) = 1.17,
which is broadly consistent with estimates by Montero and Urtasun (2013) based
on Spanish firm-level data. Wage markups are hard to estimate empirically, so we
adopt an alternative calibration strategy. We follow Galí (2011) in reinterpreting the
EHL model of wage-setting in a way that delivers equilibrium unemployment (see
Appendix B for details). Targeting an unemployment rate of 8.6% in 2007, we obtain
εw = 3.31, i.e. an initial wage markup of εw/(εw − 1) = 1.43.
The elasticity of entrepreneurial output with respect to equipment capital and
commercial real estate are set to αk = 0.11 and αh = 0.21, which are chosen to
replicate the labor share of GDP in 2007 (61.6%) and the share of equipment capital
in the total stock of productive capital.8 As in Iacoviello and Neri (2010) we set
8Using data from BBVA Research, we obtain that the value of equipment capital was 21.4% of
the total value of productive capital in 2007.
δh = 0.01, whereas δk is set to a standard value of 0.025. The elasticity of con-
struction output with respect to labor ω is set to match the construction share of
total employment in 2007 (13.4%). The weight of utility from housing services, ϑ, is
chosen to replicate gross household debt over annual GDP (80.22%). The share of
constrained and unconstrained workers in the labor baskets are set to μh = μe = 1/2.
The scale parameters of convex investment adjustment costs, Φh and Φk, are chosen
such that the fall in construction and equipment capital investment in our baseline
deleveraging scenario resembles their behavior during the crisis.9
The Calvo parameters are set to θp = 2/3 and θw = 3/4, such that prices and
wages are adjusted every 3 and 4 quarters on average, respectively. This is consistent
with survey evidence for the Spanish economy (see e.g. Druant et al., 2009).
9In particular, we set Φh and Φk such that the accumulated fall in construction and equipment
capital investment 8 quarters after the financial shock replicate their accumulated fall 8 quarters
after their peak in 2007:Q4 (24.5% and 28% respectively).
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Table 1. Baseline calibration
Parameter Value Description
Preferences
βu 0.994 unconstrained household discount factor
β 0.98 constrained household discount factor
ϕ 4 (inverse) labor supply elasticity
ϑ 0.38 weight on housing utility
εp 7 elasticity of subst. across consumption varieties
εw 3.31 elasticity of substitution across labor varieties
ωH 0.72 weight home goods in consumption basket
εH 1 elasticity of imports wrt terms of trade
εF 1 elasticity of exports wrt terms of trade
ζ 0.87 scale parameter export demand
Technology
αh 0.21 elasticity output wrt real estate
αk 0.11 elasticity output wrt equipment
ω 0.43 elasticity construction wrt labor
δh 0.01 depreciation real estate
δk 0.025 depreciation equipment
μe,μh 0.5 share of constr. households in labor baskets
Φh 6.1 investment adjustment costs construction
Φk 2.4 investment adjustment costs equipment
Price/wage setting
θp 0.67 fraction of non-adjusting prices
θw 0.75 fraction of non-adjusting wages
Debt constraints
m¯ 0.70 household LTV ratio
m¯e 0.64 entrepreneur LTV ratio
γ 0.98 amortization rate HH debt
γe 0.97 amortization rate entrepreneurial debt
Finally, the parameters that regulate the debt constraints are calibrated as fol-
lows. According to data from the Spanish Land Registry office, loan-to-value ratios
(LTV) for new mortgages prior to the crisis were slightly below 70 percent. We thus
set m¯ = 0.70 for the household’s initial loan-to-value ratio. The entrepreneurial ini-
tial loan-to-value ratio is chosen to match the ratio of gross non-financial corporate
debt to annual GDP (125.4% in 2007), which yields m¯e = 0.64. Finally, we calibrate
the contractual amortization rates, 1 − γ and 1 − γe, in order to replicate the av-
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erage age of the stock of outstanding mortgage debt prior to the crisis. This yields
1− γ = 0.02 and 1− γe = 0.03 per quarter.10 Table 1 summarizes the calibration.
4 Baseline scenario: adjustment to a deleveraging
shock
As our baseline scenario, we subject the model economy to a severe financial contrac-
tion that reduces the availability of credit for borrowers. Our ’credit crunch’ consists
of an unexpected, gradual, permanent drop in the LTV ratios of both households and
entrepreneurs, mt and met respectively. In particular, we assume an autoregressive
process for both LTV ratios: xt = (1− ρx) x¯ + ρxxt−1, x = m,me, where we set
ρm = ρm
e
= 0.75. We then simulate an unanticipated fall in the long-run LTV ratios
(m¯, m¯e) of 10 percentage points from their baseline values in Table 1, which accords
well with recent experience in Spain.11
We assume perfect foresight in all our simulations. We solve for the fully nonlinear
equilibrium path, using a variant of the Newton-Raphson algorithm developed by
Laffargue (1990), Boucekkine (1995) and Juillard (1996) (LBJ).12 As discussed in
the previous section, our assumption of long-run debt contracts gives rise to two
debt regimes for households and entrepreneurs. If collateral values are above the
contractual debt amortization paths, then debt levels are restricted by the former,
according to equations (5) and (8). If the opposite holds, then new credit flows
collapse to zero and debt is restricted by the contractual amortization path (equations
6 and 9). We have thus modified the LBJ algorithm to allow for endogenous change
of debt regime. In particular, the dates at which the regime changes take place are
solved as equilibrium objects.
Figure 1 displays the response to the credit crunch of collateral values (dashed
lines) and contractual amortization paths (thin solid lines), together with the actual
equilibrium path of outstanding debt (thick solid lines), both for entrepreneurs and
households. Before the shock (t = 0), the economy rests in the steady state of
10Under our debt contracts (with a constant fraction of outstanding debt amortized each period),
the average age of the debt stock converges in the steady state to γ/ (1− γ) and γe/ (1− γe) for
households and entrepreneurs, respectively. According to calculations by Banco de España, based
on data from the Registry office and large financial institutions, the average age of outstanding
mortgage debt prior to the crisis was close to 12.5 years for households and 8 years for nonfinancial
corporations and entrepreneurs. This yields γ = 12.5× 4/(12.5× 4+1) = 0.98 and γe = 8× 4/(8×
4 + 1) = 0.97.
11Data from the Spanish Land Registry office shows that average LTV ratios declined by 7.7
percentage points in the 6 years between 2007:Q3 and 2013:Q3.
12See also Juillard et al. (1998) for an application of the LBJ variant of the Newton-Raphson
algorithm.
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the baseline regime, where debt levels equal pledgeable collateral values.13 The
credit crunch shock drives collateral values below the contractual amortization paths
already on impact (t = 1). Therefore, the economy switches on impact to the
alternative regime in which entrepreneurial and household debt stocks decay at the
contractual amortization rates. In this phase, the economy undergoes a gradual and
prolonged deleveraging process.
Eventually, collateral values rise again above the contractual amortization path,
at which point borrowers are able to regain access to fresh funds. We denote by T ∗
and T ∗∗ the time at which the endogenous regime change takes place for entrepreneurs
and households, respectively. Notice that collateral values and debt both experience
a surge at the time of the regime change. This is because real estate becomes again
valuable as collateral (see equations 7 and 10), which pushes up borrowers’ demand
for real estate, and hence its price. Thus, T ∗ and T ∗∗ also represent the duration of
the deleveraging phase for entrepreneurs and households. In our baseline simulation,
deleveraging lasts longer for households (T ∗∗ = 22 quarters) than for entrepreneurs
(T ∗ = 13 quarters), which mainly reflects the slower amortization rate assumed for
the former (1− γ < 1− γe).14
Figure 2 shows the economy’s response to the deleveraging shock. Total consump-
tion declines as a result of the deleveraging process, and then experiences successive
recoveries when first entrepreneurs and then households regains access to new loans.
The shock has also a negative impact on total investment, driven by lower expen-
diture in both real estate and equipment capital. Interestingly, investment starts
recovering at t = 11, i.e. before the period in which entrepreneur debt actually
starts increasing (t = 14). This initial creditless recovery in investment is financed
with an increase in borrowers’ internal saving.15 Such a self-financed investment re-
covery is akin to those observed in some emerging and advanced economies in similar
13Indeed, the fact that constrained households and entrepreneurs are both more impatient than
unconstrained households, β < βu, guarantees that the collateral constraint binds for both agents
in the steady state.
14Figure 1 shows that the debt constraints (6) and (9) are binding during t = 1, ..., T ∗∗ − 1
and t = 1, ..., T ∗ − 1, respectively, whereas the collateral constraints (5 and 8) are binding for
t ≥ T ∗∗ and t ≥ T ∗, respectively. We have verified that the corresponding Lagrange multipliers are
indeed strictly positive in the relevant periods, both in the baseline scenario and in all subsequent
simulations. Results are available upon request.
15In particular, between the impact period and T ∗ entrepreneurs continuously reduce their con-
sumption, which in our framework may be interpreted as dividend payments, thus increasing their
retained earnings.
economic conditions (see e.g. Abiad, Dell’Ariccia and Li, 2011).
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Figure 1: Baseline deleveraging scenario: debt dynamics
investigate the short run and long run effects of product and labor market reforms
within the context of our model and against the background of the deleveraging
scenario described in the previous section.
The deflationary process caused by the financial shock leads to a temporary
depreciation of the terms of trade, which fosters gross exports. On the other hand,
imports fall due to the combined effect of the terms-of-trade depreciation and a severe
contraction in domestic demand. Both effects give rise to a substantial improvement
in net exports during the deleveraging period. The positive contribution of the
external sector, however, is not sufficient to avoid a protracted recession that lasts for
13 quarters. This recession produces a significant reduction in employment, despite
the induced moderation of real wages.
5 Structural reforms
Despite the fact that financial crises evolve into mostly demand-driven recessions,
policy makers and academics have advocated supply-side measures, most notably
reductions in monopolistic distortions in labor and product markets, as a way of
expanding output and employment. These structural reforms are more strongly
recommended for those economies in which such distortions were larger during the
upswing, as was the case in the periphery of the euro area. In this section we
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Figure 2: Baseline deleveraging scenario: macroeconomic adjustment
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5.1 Product market reform
We first implement a measure aimed at strengthening competition in goods markets.
In particular, we consider an unanticipated, instantaneous and permanent reduction
in the desired price markup, εp/ (εp − 1), of 5%, which falls from 1.17 to 1.11. This
measure is assumed to take place contemporaneously to the deleveraging shock. The
effects of this reform (relative to the baseline, no-reform scenario) are displayed in
Figure 3.
The main message from the figure is that the assumed product market reform has
a positive differential effect on GDP not only in the long run, as one would expect, but
also in the short and medium run. Indeed, the reform reduces both the severity and
the duration of the recession caused by the deleveraging shock. This improvement in
the short/medium run is clearly driven by investment. Intuitively, agents anticipate
the long-run gains in economic activity, which leads them to increase their demand
for investment goods already in the short run. Both construction and equipment
capital investment benefit from this effect.
The short/medium-run improvement in investment is reinforced by two related
channels. First, due to stronger demand for real estate, the reform scenario features a
much smaller drop in real estate prices. Thus, borrowers anticipate higher collateral
values (relative to the no-reform scenario) from the period in which they will regain
access to new credit. To see how this affects asset demand, consider the entrepre-
neur’s optimal demand for real estate, equation 10 (the argument for constrained
households is analogous). Integrating it forward, rescaling it by cet , normalizing the
impact period to t = 1, and finally using the fact that the collateral constraint does
not bind during the deleveraging phase (ξes = 0 for s = 1, ..., T
∗ − 1), we obtain the
following expression,
ph1 = E1
∞#
s=1
βs (1− δh)s−1
ce1
ces+1
mcs+1αh
yes+1
hes
+ce1E1
∞#
s=T ∗
βs−1 (1− δh)s−1 ξes
mes
Rs
πs+1p
h
s+1. (13)
As illustrated by the term in the second line of (13), the fact that asset prices phs+1
are higher in the reform scenario implies that so is the marginal collateral value
of real estate, ξes
mes
Rs
πs+1phs+1, from the end of deleveraging onwards, s ≥ T ∗. This
effect shifts up entrepreneur’s demand for real estate, thus raising investment demand
ceteris paribus.
Second, the reform brings forward the end of the deleveraging phase for en-
trepreneurs and households. Indeed, we now have (T ∗, T ∗∗) = (11, 18), versus
(T ∗, T ∗∗) = (13, 22) in the no-reform scenario. Since the reform scenario features
a smaller drop in collateral values, the latter catch up earlier with the contractual
debt amortization paths, allowing borrowers to regain access to new credit at an
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Figure 3: Effects of the product market reform
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earlier date.16 This implies that real estate becomes valuable as collateral also at an
earlier date (i.e. T ∗ happens sooner in equation 13). In addition, since consumption
experiences a surge after the end of both deleveraging processes, agents also antici-
pate an earlier recovery in economic activity. Both effects (possibility of borrowing
against real estate at a sooner date and an earlier exit from recession) feed back
into higher investment demand today, leading to higher real estate prices, higher
collateral values, and so on.17 In sum, by accelerating the end of the deleveraging
phase, the product market reform fosters investment and GDP in the short run even
further.
16Graphically, in Figure 1 the collateral values (the dashed lines) cross the contractual amorti-
zation paths (the thin solid lines) at an earlier date. We note that the contractual amortization
paths, γbt−1/πt and γebet−1/πt, look very similar with and without reform, such that the change in
T ∗ and T ∗∗ is driven essentially by the effect of the reform on the collateral values.
17In the case of entrepreneurs, the higher investment demand (relative to the baseline scenario)
is partially financed by a fall in their consumption, which as mentioned before may be interpreted
as a cut in dividend payments.
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We note that neither consumption nor net exports are much affected in the short
run by the product market reform. In the case of consumption, one reason is that,
while the deflationary effect of the reform produces an additional increase in real
interest rates and a rise in the real value of debt payments, this is largely compensated
by the positive income effect stemming from the anticipation of the long run gains
and by the lower fall in current asset prices. Moreover, as we will see later on, the
negative debt deflation effect produced by the reform turns out to be substantially
weakened by the presence of long-term debt. As regards the external balance, the
increase in gross exports, due to the additional depreciation in the terms of trade,
is mostly dominated by the increase in the real (PPI-deflated) value of imports, due
both to stronger domestic demand and the terms-of-trade depreciation itself.
Finally, notice that the long-run gains in GDP do not carry over to employment.
The reason is simple. The long run gains in household consumption produce an
upward shift in the labor supply schedule (i.e. a negative income effect on labor
supply) that essentially undoes the upward shift in labor demand due to stronger ac-
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tivity. As a result, the reform raises the long-run real wage while keeping employment
unchanged.
Figure 4: Effects of the labor market reform
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5.2 Labor market reform
Analogously to the product market reform, we implement an improvement in labor
market competition by means of an unexpected, instantaneous and permanent fall
of 5% in the desired wage markup, εw/ (εw − 1), which falls from 1.43 to 1.36. This
simulation proxies for a labor market reform that affects unions’ bargaining power.
The effects of this reform are depicted in Figure 4.
Unlike in the case of the product market reform, here the impact effects on GDP
and employment are essentially nil. From then on, the reform gathers momentum
over time and eventually generates a long run positive effect on GDP nearly identical
to that from the product market reform. This long-run gain extends also to employ-
ment, in contrast with the case of the product market reform. This difference stems
from the fact that real wages now experience a long-run decline (as opposed to an
increase), a logical consequence of permanently stronger labor market competition.
Unlike in the case of a product market reform, the labor market reform does
not have a noticeable effect on investment or on the duration of the deleveraging
process. One reason is that the permanent reduction in real wages shifts relative
factor demand towards labor and away from capital, which offsets the positive effect
on investment from the anticipation of long-run gains in economic activity. The
absence of an improvement in the demand for investment goods carries over to asset
prices, and hence to collateral values. As a result, the durations of the deleveraging
phases are not affected by this reform.
Instead, the gradual improvement in GDP relative to the baseline scenario is
driven mostly by consumption. On the one hand, Ricardian (unconstrained) house-
holds enjoy a positive income effect stemming from the anticipation of long-run gains.
This effect dominates the negative substitution effect coming from the increase in
real interest rates, which results from the reform-driven deflation. On the other
hand, constrained households’ wage income increases as times go by, as the increase
in employment gradually overcomes the decline in real wages.
An additional and important reason why the labor market reform is not as growth-
friendly in the short run as the product market reform is that, unlike the reduction
in price markups, the reduction in wage markups must overcome a double layer of
nominal rigidities (first wages, then prices) before affecting actual production prices
and hence international competitiveness. To visualize this more clearly, Figure 5
displays the differential effect of each reform on the terms of trade. As is clear
from the figure, the product market reform (dotted line) improves the economy’s
competitiveness much more quickly than the labor market reform (thin-solid line).
Motivated by this observation, the next subsection considers a broader labor market
reform that also facilitates nominal wage adjustment.
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5.2.1 Broader labor market reform: increased wage flexibility
In the previous section we considered a reduction in desired wage markups, in anal-
ogy with the product market reform analyzed in section 5.1. However, labor mar-
ket reforms typically affect not only desired markups over reservation wages (as a
reduced-form measure of workers’ bargaining power), but also the speed or flexibility
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with which nominal wages adjust to changes in these reservation wages.18 In this
section, we consider a broader labor market reform that includes both a reduction
in wage markups and a simultaneous increase in wage flexibility. In particular, we
reduce the Calvo wage parameter θw from 0.75 (its baseline value) to 0.66, such that
the average wage duration falls from 4 to 3 quarters.
The results are displayed in Figure 6. Comparing the latter with Figure 4, it is
clear that adding higher wage flexibility increases significantly the short/medium-
run gains in GDP and employment from a labor market reform. The reason is
that higher wage flexibility allows a faster adjustment of nominal wages, production
prices, and ultimately terms of trade, with the resulting improvement in international
competitiveness.19 This last effect becomes apparent in Figure 5: under this broader
labor market reform (thick solid lines), the pass-through from lower wage markups
18A clear example is the labor market reform of 2012 in Spain. The latter included modifications
in the regulation of collective bargaining agreements aimed at facilitating nominal wage adjustments
in response to changing economic conditions.
19Notice that this is not incompatible with the lack of improvement in net exports in Figure
6. Indeed, output can be expressed both net of imports and gross of imports. In the latter case,
output is just the sum of gross exports and domestic demand of domestic goods. Both components
improve ceteris paribus as a result of the additional terms-of-trade depreciation.
Figure 5: Diferential effect of reforms on terms of trade
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 31 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1421
to terms of trade is much stronger than under the basic labor market reform. Of
course, in the long-run the gains in economic activity are the same as in both cases,
6 Inspecting the mechanisms
6.1 The role of the foreign sector
An important channel in the transmission of the effects of structural reforms is the
foreign sector. Figures 3, 4 and 6 suggest that reforms have little effect (or even a
negative one) on the trade balance in the short/medium run. In fact, this hides two
counteracting forces: structural reforms foster gross exports (and depress imports) by
because by then wages have fully adjusted to their flexible levels.
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Figure 6: Broader labor market reform (wage markups and wage flexibility)
further depreciating the terms of trade relative to the baseline scenario, but they also
boost imports by improving domestic demand. This suggests that the short/medium
run effects of structural reforms may depend on the sensitivity of trade flows to the
terms of trade depreciation produced by such reforms.
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To analyze this question, we compute and display in Figure 7 the differential
effect of each type of structural reform on GDP (i.e. the difference between the two
lines in the upper left panels in Figures 3 and 4) for different values of the terms-of-
trade elasticity of exports, εF , and imports, εH . The message from the figure is clear:
higher price elasticities of trade flows lead to larger positive effects from structural
reforms. In the case of the product market reform, lower elasticities yield smaller
gains. In the case of the labor market reforms (both the baseline and the broader
one), lower elasticities actually change the sign of the short-run effects. That is, a
reform aimed at reducing wages may be counterproductive if exports and imports
do not respond sufficiently to the resulting depreciation of the terms of trade. These
results bear an important message: the short-run effects of structural reforms on
economic activity are dependent on the intensity with which trade flows react to the
ensuing improvement in international competitiveness.
6.2 Long-term versus one-period debt
The presence of long term mortgaged debt is one of the main departures of our model
from most previous analysis of the macroeconomic implications of deleveraging. In
this subsection we take a close look at the implications of this financial assumption
as compared with the more standard one based on one-period debt contracts.
6.2.1 The baseline scenario with long-term vs one-period debt
Our main motivation for introducing long-run debt is to allow our model to produce a
realistic scenario of private-sector deleveraging, i.e. one that features a slow reduction
in debt stocks and a protracted recession. To shed light on how long-term debt
shapes things in this regard, Figure 8 compares the effects of the credit crunch
under long-term debt with those that would follow in the case of one-period debt
contracts (γ = 0). Under this last assumption, the deleveraging shock produces
a much faster reduction in debt levels.20 This is because debt in that scenario is
always directly linked to collateral values, which fall sharply on impact, mostly as
a result of the sudden drop in real estate prices. The abrupt reduction in debt
20Actual debt levels (rescaled by initial GDP) fall even more abruptly than the debt-to-GDP
ratios displayed in Figure 8, due to the sharp fall in GDP.
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Figure 7: GDP effects of reforms for different terms-of-trade elasticities
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Figure 8: Baseline deleveraging scenario: long-term vs. one-period debt
carries over to total consumption, GDP and employment, all of which fall sharply
on impact and then recover very quickly. By contrast, with long-term debt, the fact
that collateral constraints cease to bind for a number of periods implies an initial
decoupling between asset prices and debt levels. In the short term, this provides some
relief to borrowers’ expenditure capacity, giving rise to a much smoother and more
persistent decline in consumption, GDP and employment. In this way, long term
debt produces a realistic scenario of prolonged recession caused by a slow process of
debt reduction, consistently with most observed deleveraging episodes.21
21See, e.g., Garrote et al. (2013) for an international comparison of historical episodes of delever-
aging.
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6.2.2 How long-term debt influences the effects of reforms
The exercises in the previous section show that, in our setup, structural reforms are
generally positive for GDP and employment even in the short run. Specifically, a
product market reform (via lower price markups; see Figure 3) and an encompassing
labor market reform (via lower wage markups and higher wage flexibility; see Figure
6) both reduce already on impact the output and employment losses caused by the
deleveraging shock. These positive short-run effects of reforms obtain despite the
fact that markup reductions unleash deflationary forces, which both increase the real
value of debt repayments and (coupled with a constant nominal policy rate) raise
the real interest rate. We next discuss how the presence of borrowing constraints
and long-term debt affect the short-term negative deflationary channel.
First, the presence of long-term debt substantially weakens the effect of reforms-
driven deflation on borrowers’ spending capacity. To see this, consider the entre-
preneur’s real debt cash flows (net of interest payments) prior to T ∗, i.e. when she
cannot obtain new credit and simply repays her debt according to the contractual
rate (bet = γ
ebet−1/πt),
22
bet −
Rt−1
πt
bet−1 = −
Rt−1 − γe
πt
bet−1.
We learn from this expression that the negative effects of deflation on real debt
cash flows are mitigated by the existence of long-term debt, i.e. the fact that γe
is positive and typically close to 1. In particular, notice that Rt−1 − γe equals
(Rt−1 − 1) + (1− γe), i.e. the sum of the net interest rate and the amortization rate
of the long-term contract. Both terms are first-order in magnitude, as is their sum.
As a result, a first-order effect of reforms on inflation will only have second-order
effects on borrowers’ spending capacity.
Second, the existence of debt constraints (whether linked to collateral values or
to contractual amortization paths) mitigates the intensity of the intertemporal sub-
stitution effects through which real interest rates affect consumption. For instance,
in the regime in which outstanding debt levels decay mechanically at the contractual
rates, the direct impact of changes in real interest rates on the consumption decisions
of constrained debtors is very small, given that they do not obtain new loans.23
Thus, borrowing constraints and long-term debt together mitigate the short-term
impact of the deflationary forces unchained by structural reforms, which typically
22A similar argument applies to the case of constrained households.
23In fact, in the debt regime in which debtors are constrained by the (binding) contractual amor-
tization path, their consumption Euler equations only serve to determine the Lagrange multipliers
on the latter constraints.
affect demand negatively through a combination of Fisherian debt deflation and
rising real interest rates.
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Figure 9: GDP effects of reforms: long-term vs. one-period debt
However, the presence of long term debt also attenuates one of the main channels
through which structural reforms foster economic activity in the long-run. As we
showed in section 5.1, the product market reform has quite a strong positive effect
on real estate prices, and hence on borrowers’ collateral values. However, long-term
debt produces a decoupling between collateral values and debt capacity for the entire
duration of the deleveraging processes (t ≤ T ∗, T ∗∗). This impedes households’ and
entrepreneurs’ spending capacity from benefiting from higher collateral values in the
short run. Thus, long term debt weakens the impact of asset prices on economic
activity, which is a key component of the expectations channel of structural reforms.
To see how the above effects all combine together, we compute and show in Figure
9 the GDP effects of the product market and (baseline) labor market reforms, relative
to the no-reform scenario, both under long-term and one-period debt. Focusing first
on the product market reform (left panel), we learn that long-term debt dampens the
short-run GDP gain, as compared with the scenario of one period debt. Thus, the
attenuation of the asset price channel just discussed clearly dominates the mitigation
of the deflationary channel.
On the contrary, long-term debt improves the short-run effects of the labor market
reform (right panel of Figure 9). The reason is simple. The latter reform has, if
anything, a small negative effect on real estate, in addition to a deflationary effect
(see Figure 4). Thus, long-term debt works towards dampening both negative effects
on economic activity.
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Summing up, the role played by long term debt on the short run impact of reforms
is important but by no means mechanical. Importantly, its presence waters down
the impact of asset prices, providing a more realistic picture of the path to recovery
following a credit crunch, when limited access to new loans reduces the relevance of
available collateral temporarily.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we assess the effects of reforms in product and labor markets in an
open economy undergoing a protracted deleveraging of the private sector, with no
room for fiscal or monetary stimuli. We argue that in a context of widespread
credit restrictions and pre-existing long-term debt, which are core features of the
current deleveraging processes faced by the periphery countries of the Euro area,
reducing desired markups in product markets mitigates the short-run output and
employment losses caused by the deleveraging shock. Furthermore, by stimulating a
faster recovery of investment and, hence, of collateral accumulation, such a reform
brings forward the end of the contractionary deleveraging phase. A reduction in
desired wage markups, complemented by enhanced nominal wage flexibility, is found
to have also the potential to moderate the output and employment losses in the
short-run, although with little effects on investment and, hence, on the duration and
intensity of deleveraging.
The foreign sector plays an important role in the short-run effects of reforms:
the deflationary effect of the reforms lead to a terms-of-trades depreciation, with the
resulting expansion in gross exports. In this regard, we find that the intensity with
which improved international competitiveness carries over to actual trade flows is
an important determinant of the short-run effects of structural reforms. In the case
of labour market reforms aimed at moderating wages, a low responsiveness of net
exports to the ensuing gains in competitiveness may render the reform negative for
GDP and employment in the short term.
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Appendix
A. Equilibrium conditions
Let p˜t ≡ P˜H,t/PH,t, pH,t ≡ PH,t/Pt, wt ≡ Wt/Pt, w˜t ≡ W˜t/Wt, πwt ≡ Wt/Wt−1.
Equilibrium conditions:
• Unconstrained household budget constraint and first-order conditions (dt, hut ),
cut + dt + p
h
t

hut − (1− δh)hut−1

=
Rt−1
πt
dt−1 + wtn
u
t , (14)
1
cut
= βuEt
Rt
πt+1
1
cut+1
, (15)
pht
cut
=
ϑ
hut
+ βuEt
(1− δh) pht+1
cut+1
. (16)
• Constrained household budget constraint, debt constraints, and first-order con-
ditions (bt, ht),
cct +
Rt−1
πt
bt−1 + p
h
t [ht − (1− δh)ht−1] = bt + wtnct , (17)
bt ≤

R−1t mtEtπt+1p
h
t+1ht, if mtR
−1
t Etπt+1p
h
t+1ht ≥ γbt−1/πt,
γbt−1/πt, if mtR−1t Etπt+1p
h
t+1ht < γbt−1/πt,
(18)
1
cct
= βEt
Rt
πt+1
1
cct+1
+ ξt1 (ϑt ≥ 0)+μt1 (ϑt < 0)−βγEt
μt+1
πt+1
1 (ϑt+1 < 0) , (19)
pht
cct
=
ϑ
ht
+ βEt
(1− δh) pht+1
cct+1
+ ξt1 (ϑt ≥ 0)
mt
Rt
Etπt+1p
h
t+1, (20)
where μt is the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (6) in the text, 1 (·) is the
indicator function and ϑt ≡ R−1t mtEtπt+1pht+1ht − γbt−1/πt.
• Entrepreneur budget constraint, debt constraints, and first-order conditions
(bet , h
e
t , n
e
t , kt),
cet = mctk
αk
t−1

het−1
αh (net )1−αh−αk − wtnet − pht

het − (1− δh)het−1

+bet −
Rt−1
πt
bet−1 − qt [kt − (1− δk) kt−1] + Πt + Πht + Πkt , (21)
bet ≤

R−1t m
e
tEtπt+1p
h
t+1h
e
t , if m
e
tR
−1
t Etπt+1p
h
t+1h
e
t ≥ γebet−1/πt,
γebet−1/πt, if m
e
tR
−1
t Etπt+1p
h
t+1h
e
t < γ
ebet−1/πt,
(22)
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1
cet
= βEt
Rt
πt+1
1
cet+1
+ξet1 (ϑ
e
t ≥ 0)+μet1 (ϑet < 0)−βγeEt
μet+1
πt+1
1

ϑet+1 < 0

, (23)
pht
cet
= βEt
mct+1αhk
αk
t (h
e
t )
αh−1 net+1
1−αh−αk + (1− δh) pht+1
cet+1
+ξet
met
Rt
Etπt+1p
h
t+11 (ϑ
e
t ≥ 0) ,
(24)
wt = mct (1− αh − αk) kαkt−1

het−1
αh (net )−αh−αk , (25)
qt
cet
= βEt
mct+1αkk
αk−1
t (h
e
t )
αh

net+1
1−αh−αk + (1− δk) qt+1
cet+1
, (26)
where μet is the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (6) in the text, and ϑ
e
t ≡
R−1t m
e
tEtπt+1p
h
t+1h
e
t − γebet−1/πt.
• Retailers’ optimal price decision, and aggregate profits,
Et
∞#
s=0
(βθp)
s c
e
t
cet+s

p˜t!s
j=1 πH,t+j
pH,t+s −
εp
εp − 1mct+s
!s
j=1 πH,t+j
p˜t
εp
yt+s = 0,
(27)
Πrt = yt (pH,t −mctΔt) , (28)
• Dynamics of PPI inflation and price dispersion,
1 = (1− θ) p˜1−εpt + θπε
p−1
H,t , (29)
Δt ≡ (1− θ) p˜−ε
p
t + θπ
εp
H,tΔt−1. (30)
• Construction firm output, first order conditions (nht , iht ), and profits,
Iht =

nht
ω

iht

1− Φh
2

iht
iht−1
− 1
	21−ω
, (31)
wt = p
h
t ω

nht
ω−1

iht

1− Φh
2

iht
iht−1
− 1
	21−ω
, (32)
1 = pht

nht
ω
(1− ω)

iht


1− Φh
2

diht
2
−ω 

1− Φh
2

diht
2 − Φh

diht
 iht
iht−1

+β
λet+1
λet
pht+1

nht+1
ω
(1− ω)

iht+1


1− Φh
2

diht+1
2
−ω
Φhdi
h
t+1

iht+1
iht
	2
,(33)
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Πht = p
h
t I
h
t − wtnht − iht , (34)
for diht ≡ iht /iht−1 − 1.
• Equipment capital producers output, first order condition (it), and profits,
It = it

1− Φk
2

it
it−1
− 1
	2
, (35)
1 = qt


1− Φk
2
(dit)
2 − Φk (dit)
it
it−1

+ Et
λet+1
λet
qt+1Φkdit+1
i2t+1
i2t
, (36)
Πkt = qtIt − it, (37)
for dit ≡ it/it−1 − 1.
• Optimal wage decision,
• Export demand,
xt = ζ (p
∗
t )
−εF yF,t. (44)
• Intermediate good market clearing,
ytΔt = k
αk
t−1

het−1
αh (net )1−αh−αk , (45)
• Labor market clearing,
nct + n
u
t = n
e
t + n
h
t . (46)
#
x=c,u
Et
∞#
s=0
(βxθw)
s
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
w˜t
s!
j=1
πw,t+j
wt+s
cxt+s
−
εwχ

nxt+s
ϕ
εw − 1
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
w˜t
s!
j=1
πw,t+j
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
−εwϕ⎤
⎥⎥⎦
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
s!
j=1
πw,t+j
w˜t
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
εw
nxt+s = 0,
(38)
with βc = β.
• Dynamics of wage inflation and wage dispersion,
1 = (1− θw) w˜1−ε
w
t + θwπ
εw−1
wt , (39)
Δ
w,n
t = (1− θw) w˜−ε
w
t + θwπ
εw
wtΔ
w,n
t−1. (40)
• Aggregate employment,
N ct = n
c
tΔ
w,n
t , (41)
Nut = n
u
tΔ
w,n
t , (42)
Nt = N
c
t +N
u
t , (43)
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• Consumption goods basket market clearing,
yt = c
c
H,t + c
u
H,t + c
e
H,t + iH,t + i
h
H,t + xt. (47)
• Real estate market clearing,
ht + h
u
t + h
e
t = I
h
t + (1− δh)

ht−1 + h
u
t−1 + h
e
t−1

. (48)
• Equipment capital market clearing,
kt = (1− δk) kt−1 + It. (49)
• Real wages,
wt = wt−1
πwt
πt
, (50)
• Terms of trade,
p∗t = p
∗
t−1
πH,t
πF,t
. (51)
• Relative demand for domestic goods,
pH,tc
c
H,t = ωHc
c
t , (52)
pH,tc
u
H,t = ωHc
u
t , (53)
pH,tc
e
H,t = ωHc
e
t , (54)
pH,tiH,t = ωHit, (55)
pH,ti
h
H,t = ωHi
h
t , (56)
• Relative demand for constrained/unconstrained household labor,
(1− μ)nct = μnut , (57)
where μ ≡ μe = μh.
• Relative domestic producer prices,
pH,t = pH,t−1
πH,t
πt
, (58)
• CPI inflation,
π1−εHt =
ωH

p∗t−1
1−εH
ωH

p∗t−1
1−εH + 1− ωH
π1−εHH,t +
1− ωH
ωH

p∗t−1
1−εH + 1− ωH
, (59)
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• Real (PPI-deflated) GDP,
gdpt = yt +
1
pH,t
(qtIt − it) +
1
pH,t

pht I
h
t − iht

, (60)
• Gross nominal interest rate,
Rt = R
∗ exp

−ψdt − bt − b
e
t
pH,tgdpt
	
. (61)
B. Equilibrium unemployment
Following Galí (2011), we assume that each representative household consists of a
unit squared of individuals indexed by (i, j) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1], where i represents the
variety of labor service provided by the individual and j indexes her disutility from
working, given by χjϕ. Let nxt (i) denote the number of variety-i workers in household
x = c, u employed at time t. Total household disutility from working is given by
χ
$ 1
0
$ nxt (i)
0
jϕdjdi = χ
$ 1
0
nxt (i)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
di,
for x = c, u. Given the type-specific wage Wt (i), the number of type-i workers that
each household would like to send to work is given by
argmax
nxt (i)

λxt
Wt (i)
Pt
nxt (i)− χ
nxt (i)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ

=

λxt
χ
Wt (i)
Pt
	1/ϕ
≡ lxt (i) ,
for x = c, u, where λxt ≡ 1/cxt . Unemployment in the market for type-i labor is
just the number of workers willing to work at the going wage minus effective labor
demand: ut (i) ≡
 
x=c,u l
x
t (i)−
 
x=c,u n
x
t (i) .Let
lxt ≡
$ 1
0
lxt (i) di =

λxt
χ
Wt
Pt
	1/ϕ $ 1
0

Wt (i)
Wt
	1/ϕ
di =

λxt
χ
Wt
Pt
	1/ϕ
Δwt

− 1
ϕ
	
,
Nxt ≡
$ 1
0
nxt (i) di = n
x
t
$ 1
0

Wt (i)
Wt
	−εw
di = nxtΔ
w
t (εw) ,
denote total household-specific labor supply and labor demand, respectively, for x =
c, u, where Δw,lt ≡
" 1
0
(Wt (i) /Wt)
1/ϕ di and Δw,Nt ≡
" 1
0
(Wt (i) /Wt)
−εw di are indexes
of wage dispersion. Then aggregate unemployment is
ut ≡
$ 1
0
ut (i) di = lt −Nt.
where lt ≡
 
x=c,u l
x
t and Nt ≡
 
x=c,uN
x
t are aggregate labor supply and labor
demand, respectively. Finally, the unemployment rate is uratet ≡ ut/lt.
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